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1.INTRODUCTION
The  issue  of  animal  minds  continues  to  engender  philosophical  debate.1 
Famously, Descartes considered animals without speech as automata, complex and 
fascinating machines with no internal  lives.2 Such a view shaped the subsequent 
intellectual  milieu even after Darwin’s theory, that closed the gap between humans 
and  other  species.  For  a  long  time  it  has  been  thought  that  the  only  hope  for 
unveiling the capacity for thought of these creatures, thus bringing mental light into 
the dark matter, was by teaching them a form of language, and this position gave 
rise to a number of research projects. From the Kellogs in the 1930s to the Hayeses 
in the 1950s up to the Gardners (1970s) and the Premacks (1980-90s) much effort 
has been spent in teaching animals a symbolic system so as to check their cognitive 
abilities  (Wallman  1992).  Notwithstanding  recent  interesting  findings  (Savage-
Rumbaugh  1986),  the  paradigmatic  presupposition  on  which  these  attempts  are 
founded has recently been challenged: does thought necessarily require a language? 
That  is  to  say:  is  it  possible  to  conceive  non-linguistic  behavior  as  driven  and 
planned by thought-like states?
Considerations in favor of animal mentality have been advanced by many 
philosophers3 and ethologists4 but  the general  attitude remains  one of  skepticism 
even among ethologists,5 the chief objection being that animals behavior could be 
explained  by  reference  to  complex  series  of  stimula  and  responses.  There  are 
intermediate positions6 that grant some form of proto-thought to animals other than 
humans, but some of those who favor the attribution of concepts to animals continue 
to assert that concepts are dependent on the capacity for symbol processing.7
It  is  revealing  that  philosophers,  empirical  scientists,  psychologists  and 
ethologists converge on the thought-language issue as this opens up the possibility 
of exchanging ideas and methods between the two groups of scholars. In the spirit of 
stressing this interaction, in this chapter I will firstly discuss the arguments against 
animal beliefs; I will then outline some general conditions for the individuation of 
functional states with content and for the attribution of intentional states to animals, 
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conditions stemming from the arguments against animals’ beliefs; and  finally, I will 
test these conditions against empirical cases.
2.THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL BELIEF
In a paper written many years ago Malcolm imagines a dog chasing a cat. 
The cat runs toward an oak tree but, at the last moment, swerves and disappears up a 
nearby maple. “The dog does not see this maneuver and on arriving at the oak tree 
[...] barks excitedly into the branch above” (1972, 13). According to Malcolm we 
can say that the dog thinks the cat is in the tree but we cannot say that he has the 
thought “the cat is in the tree.” This idea has been attacked by Davidson who rejects 
the  possibility  of  having  thoughts  without  mastering  a  language.  According  to 
Davidson, there are three key preconditions for the proper attribution of intentional 
states: i) beliefs, and in general thoughts, attributed to anybody must reflect semantic 
opacity,8 because such a logical feature has been considered to distinguish talk about 
propositional attitude from talk of other things (cf. 1985, 475); ii) semantic opacity 
requires  the  mastering  of  concepts,  and  iii) the  attribution  of  concepts,  in  turn, 
presupposes a form of conceptual holism. Because it is neither possible to attribute 
concepts  nor  a  holistic  net  of  concepts  to  animals,  it  is  not  possible  to  ascribe 
semantically opaque thoughts to them; hence speechless animals cannot have beliefs 
and desires. Finally, Davidson argued that in order to have a belief one has to have 
the concept of a belief, that is, of a state that could be true or false. Now, even if 
some authors have disputed the importance of semantic opacity as a requirement for 
intentionality (e.g., Searle 1983), I share Davidson’s idea that this feature is central 
in the analysis of intentional states.9 Following Davidson, then, we can transform the 
question regarding  the  supposed  thoughts  of  mute animals  into  whether  we can 
make sense of opacity in contexts that exclude linguistic expressions.
Throughout his analysis of animal beliefs, Davidson is substantially guided 
by something like “Russell’s Principle”, according to which, in order to think about 
an object or to make a judgment about an object, one must know which object is in 
question (Russell 1912, 58; cf. Evans 1982, 65, 90 et pass.).10 In Davidson, the kind 
of knowledge Russell’s Principle is calling for amounts exclusively to  conceptual 
knowledge. However, construed in this form, Russell’s Principle seems too strong. 
Imagine observing two patches of red texture, one of which is darker than the other. 
Suppose you come to believe that the patch on your left is darker than the other. Yet, 
given the possibility that you lack the relevant concepts for the two shades of color, 
it would follow that you cannot be credited with the mentioned belief. Moreover, 
adopting Russell’s Principle seems incorrect for a deeper reason. Belief is the basis 
of knowledge in that the latter can be taken, at least, as justified true belief. Nothing 
can be known if it is not believed in one way or another. Now, taking something like 
Russell’s Principle as a precondition for beliefs’ attribution begs the question of this 
notion of believing because the precondition is far more complex than the condition 
to be fixed.
To save  this  Principle,  another  route  is  viable:  weakening  its  satisfaction 
conditions.  In  the case  of the two patches  of  color,  Russell’s  Principle could be 
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satisfied by nonconceptual discriminatory abilities (cf. Peacocke 1992). This weaker 
construal is the one given by Strawson (1971), according to which the knowledge of 
an object amounts to the ability to discriminate such an object when perceived at a 
time; to recognize it if presented; and to discriminate facts about it. Hence, we may 
say  that  the  discriminatory  abilities  can  be,  at  least,  “nonconceptual”—as  to 
perceptual  discrimination  and  recognition—and  “conceptual”—as  in  the  case  of 
knowledge  of  facts.11 Many  have  forcefully  argued  against  the  notion  of 
nonconceptual  content.12 In  its  place,  these  authors  have  proposed  the  notion  of 
demonstrative  concepts,  one  that  plays  the  same  role  as  that  attributed  to 
nonconceptual contents, without being holistic. Imagine me uttering: “This one is 
edible” in front of a piece of yellowish stuff. The demonstrative is referentially clear 
enough to bring about the belief in my interlocutor that something is edible here 
without her knowing what  kind of thing it is that is edible. So the demonstrative 
concept  does  not  allow forming any inferential  connection with the particular  in 
question, while  it  allows just  partial  connections  to the concept  of  edibility.  The 
example, however, might be dramatized: if every object we eat cannot be recognized 
(imagine a world where food changes continuously and we have to check it every 
time) then there would be no stable inferential liaisons we can use to fix the concept 
of  edibility.  On the other  hand,  the belief  this is  edible would allow for  opaque 
substitution in the attribution practice.  So, while demonstrative concepts may not 
meet the individuation conditions for concepts such as Davidson has in mind — 
which is how he arrived at the position that there is no clear answer to the question 
of whether the Ancients believed that the Earth was flat (cf. Davidson 1975, 168)— 
they are sufficient for crediting the individual with beliefs. 
As I said, I think that Davidson is right in claiming that one of the standards 
for attributing thought must be opacity, so we should presume that having thoughts 
entails having referentially opaque thoughts based on elements that themselves need 
neither to be of a fully conceptual nature nor holistically individuated or connected. 
The general  idea, then, is that a system can be credited with a perceptually fixed 
belief that p if, during the fixation of the belief, the elements included in p are either 
i,  perceptually  discriminated  or  recognized  by  the  system,  or  ii,  the  system 
discriminates facts about them. For instance, if the belief that p is, in this particular 
case, the belief that a is F, then the belief that p can be attributed to the system if the 
system is able to discriminate the individual a and the property F according to one 
of the three possible ways mentioned. All the discriminatory abilities of a system 
form what I shall label the epistemic window of a system. We then may say that the 
beliefs that can be attributed to a system are those whose elements fall within the 
system’s  epistemic  window.13 Some  systems  have,  as  it  were,  a  poor  epistemic 
window:  most  animals  cannot  be  credited  with  the  ability  to  know  facts  about 
objects. In this sense I think that many discussions on animals’ concepts are biased 
by the idea that concepts are all-or-nothing entities and that the standard of these 
entities are set by skilled adult human beings. But concepts should not be taken in 
this way: my concept of  atom differs greatly from that of a physicist, and my four 
years’ old son may get the notion of constituent part which is to my concept of atom 
as this is to the physicist’s one.14
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In  order to ascribe perceptually fixed beliefs  to non-speaking animals, the 
epistemic window is not sufficient. In fact, the epistemic window is not enough to 
warrant  the sensitivity of  the system to semantically opaque thoughts,  and since 
semantic opacity helps in distinguishing talk about beliefs  from other  talks,  it  is 
important to show how the epistemic window and semantic opacity converge.15
In this respect, it is important to inquire what the philosophical significance 
of semantic opacity is. Even if knowing entails believing, both epistemic conditions 
share  the  semantic  feature  of  not  necessarily  allowing  co-referential  substitution 
salva veritate. This stresses that truth is a much stronger notion than knowledge and 
belief: if you could get  a truth, so to speak, by itself, then you would get all the 
possible  expressions  of  that  truth;  whereas  if  you  were  able  to  isolate  the  pure 
knowledge or belief of a certain fact, you will not gain the whole truth about that 
fact, even if your knowledge is justified and your belief is true. This is because other 
possible true formulations of that fact are not necessarily included in the isolated 
knowing or belief. The distance that is present between knowledge and belief, on the 
one side, and truth on the other, marks our epistemic fallibility; that is, marks that 
we may be wrong about a matter of fact even if we are right to believe the very same 
fact (“It is not Tully that denounced Catiline, Cicero did!”). It is epistemic fallibility, 
the possibility of being mistaken and of being able to recognize such mistakes, that 
makes sense of intentional attribution.16 It is not necessary, then, to take the problem 
of mistaking as an extra requirement for the proper attribution of intentional states, 
as Davidson believes: such a condition is already included in the semantic opacity 
requirement.
3.THE REQUIREMENTS FOR BELIEVING
According  to  the  functional  approach,  systems  have  complex  internal 
workings, framed in terms of states and processes functionally construed. In one of 
the deepest analyses of this approach, Loar (1980) considers functional states as a 
net of horizontal links. This net encompass perceptual inputs, internal workings—as 
inferences and the like—and behavioral outputs. Functional states are individuated 
through a process of theory construction, in which the internal states are analyzed, 
compared and contrasted with the overall behavior of the system. This horizontal net 
also  has  some  vertical  connections.  Some  functional  states,  in  fact,  tend  to  be 
reliably activated by non-mental conditions, so that we can say that these states are 
associated with certain truth-conditions even if they are independent from them.17
One  of  the  most  prominent  tasks  of  the  functional  approach,  then,  is  to 
interpret  the  internal  states  and  processes  that  exist  between  an  input,  whether 
perceptual or conceptual, and an output, any kind of behavior, so as to individuate 
the  content of these states and processes. Interpretation can be considered as that 
epistemic process that aims at individuating the contents of functional states. These 
contents,  in  turn,  may  have  different  functional  status  if  they  are  embedded  in 
epistemic states  (e.g.  beliefs)  or conative ones (e.g.  desires).  These contents and 
their functional  status determine the causal  role  played  by the states  themselves. 
However, when we wonder whether to attribute beliefs to animals, it is essential to 
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consider which are the features of this notion that  we take to be determining.  It 
seems to me that there are three different ways in which we can spell out the notion 
of content.18
3.1Contents of type 1
If a system discriminates a property, say F, then we assume that there is some 
internal  process  we  can  interpret  as  an  F-detector.  The  resulting  state  can  be 
considered a functional state whose content is “F is present”.19 This interpretation is 
based on the relation of indication, the simplest form of interpretation.20 Consider a 
gauge that detects the presence of water in a tank. We can say that it  indicates the 
presence  of  water  in  the  tank.  However,  the  gauge  indicates  what  it  does 
independently of the way in which its object is individuated: if it indicates water, 
then it indicates H2O molecules in a liquid state or the kind of liquid I just had a 
glass of. An indicating relation then allows only for transparent readings.21 As to the 
problem of predicting the system’s behavior, it does not matter which reading one 
picks up: all the possible equivalent readings have the same predictive or explicative 
power. Strictly speaking, the detection system indicates that the mechanism itself is 
in a certain situation: the float in the tank is in a certain position if everything is 
properly working. Complete transparency follows. The consequence is that contents 
of type 1 fail to be associated with the appropriate truth conditions only in case the 
system is malfunctioning. For instance, a gauge might indicate the presence of water 
in the tank even in absence of water only if the gauge or its detection apparatus are 
malfunctioning. If everything is properly working, then the content indicates what it 
is associated with. So, type 1 contents are transparent and can be false only in case 
of malfunction. Hence, no intentional states can be attributed to systems endowed 
just with content of type 1.
3.2Contents of type 2
Type 2 contents, like those of type 1, are typically associated with some truth 
conditions. However, a malfunction of the system is not necessary in order to sever 
the connection between a given state in the system and some truth-conditions which 
are usually responsible for the system to be in that state. Consider  Malcolm's dog 
again. When we say that the dog barks at the tree because, loosely speaking, the dog 
believes that the cat is in the tree, we are saying that the dog is in an epistemic state 
that we may interpret as having the content “the cat is in the tree”. As in the case of 
content of type 1, the interpretation of the internal state of Malcolm’s dog allows for 
other  co-extensional  readings  too.22 However,  the  correctness  of  the  functional 
state’s interpretation does not imply that the truth-conditions hold: it is possible that 
the  cat  is  not  in  the  tree  even  if  nothing  in  the  visual  apparatus  of  the  dog  is 
malfunctioning. Let’s  be clear about this:  you  may have individuated the correct 
content  attribution, in terms of the explanations and descriptions of the system’s 
behavior and in terms of the reliable association that activates that state, without this 
content being true and without there being any malfunction in the system. In order 
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to correct a state with an erroneous type 1 content you should fix (at least a part of) 
the structure of the system; to correct a state with an erroneous type 2 content you 
should provide  more information to the system itself. In case a system exhibits a 
behavior with respect to which the attribution of type 2 content is justified, we must 
postulate  some  representational function between stimulus and response,  that  is, 
some cognitive activity that  mediates between sensory inputs and motor outputs. 
What  this  shows is  that  this  kind  of  content  does  not  allow for  every  possible 
substitution: at least some substitution may change the system’s behavior – which is, 
as we saw when examining Davidson’s standard for attributing mental content to an 
agent, exactly what we want: the opacity criteria is vindicated by the advocate of 
attributing mental activity to animals other than humans.
3.3Contents of type 3
Here we get to the notion of content as is customarily attributed to human 
beings.  In  this  case,  contents  allow  for  opaque  readings  and  their  correct 
individuation establishes a weaker relation to truth conditions. If John believes that 
Cicero  denounced  Catiline  this  does  not  entail  that  John  believes  that  Tully 
denounced  Catiline  because,  even  if  Cicero  is Tully,  John  may  not  have  this 
information. Ascriptive talk is opaque in case of states with type 3 contents. This is 
so because, as is commonly known, intentional contents refer to their object through 
a  “mode  of  presentation”,  and  modes  of  presentation,  namely  the  various  ways 
through which it is possible to identify a given state of affair or event, are more fine-
grained than their associated truth conditions. In case of type 3 content it is essential 
to pick up the correct mode of presentation in order to have a good prediction or 
explanation of the system’s behavior. Finally, as in the case of states with type 2 
content, the possibility of John’s having an internal  state whose content does not 
reflect  a  given  state  of  affair  does  not  necessarily  entail  any  malfunctioning  in 
John’s  epistemic  or  perceptual  apparatus.  Similarly,  type  3  contents  allow  for 
opaque readings and can be false without the system having any malfunctioning.
How should we use these  different  notions  of  content?  It  is  important  to 
notice that attributing type 3 contents to a system entails that it would show different 
behaviors with respect to the elements that form the content of John’s belief, if these 
were caught by different modes of presentation. John saying “Yes” to the question: 
“Did Cicero denounced Catiline?” does not entail John saying “Yes” to “Did Tully 
denounced  Catiline?”.  Can something like this  happen  in the case  of  animals in 
which type 2 contents operate?  The difference between type 3 contents and type 2 
contents  is a difference in the degree of granular fineness. The advocates of the 
thought-language  identification,  as  Davidson  and  possibly  Chomsky,  have 
maintained that if a thought is not fine-grained as ours it is not a thought. They have 
excluded the possibility of  thoughts  of  different  grain.  The possibility of type  2 
contents  shows that there is  at least another option viable: contents of type 2 fix 
equivalence sets between ways of describing the elements that constitute the content 
of a given belief that are much larger than those fixed by contents of type 3 but not 
as comprehensive as contents of type 1. How can this difference be assessed? By the 
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capacity that systems have to adapting their behaviors to changes in the mode of 
presentation.
4.ATTRIBUTING CONTENTS TO MUTE ANIMALS
In order to find plausible candidates of intentional behavior in animals I will 
consider deceptive behaviors because these can be performed both through language 
and mute action. Among human beings there are a variety of kinds of deceptions, 
and even if deception seems an intentional notion in itself, there are some cases in 
which it is possible to deceive in a non-intentional way (cf. Chisholm and Feehan 
1977). In order to reinforce the intentional interpretation of deception it should be 
conceived as voluntarily and goal-directed in that the deceptive behavior should not 
be an automatic response (such as camouflage or mimicry) and should not achieve 
its end by chance (the deceiving result must be brought about as driven by a goal). 
Let me clarify this by an example. In the Odyssey, Ulysses deceives his enemies by 
concealing his identity. He arrives in Ithaca dressed as a vagrant. His deception is 
voluntarily  and  goal-directed:  it  is  voluntarily  because  it  is  not  an  automatic 
response; it is goal-directed because Ulysses’ acting as a vagrant is aimed not at the 
pure exhibition of his deceiving ability, but as the result of a plan intended at the 
verification of his enemies’ political and moral behavior. Does this case of deception 
establish a positive case for an intentional attribution? May we say that Ulysses’ 
enemies believe that “a vagrant has arrived”? I think the answer should be positive. 
Ulysses’ enemies can be credited with the belief “a vagrant has arrived” because i) 
the  elements  “vagrant”,  “Ulysses”  and  the  property  of  arriving fall  within  their 
epistemic window and these elements  can be described  through functional  states 
interpreted in terms of their various contents; ii) it would be possible to ascribe to 
Ulysses’ enemies the content “Ulysses has arrived” that is contingently equivalent to 
the content of the supposed belief; iii) the attribution of a functional state interpreted 
as having one content does not imply the attribution of a functional state interpreted 
as having the other,  therefore  we may say that  Ulysses’  enemies  believe that  “a 
vagrant has arrived”.
It  should  be  stressed,  thought,  that  invoking  voluntariness  and  goal-
directedness is not question begging on intentional content: these notions, as I have 
construed them here, can be attributed by using type 1 contents while intentional 
notions require at least contents of type 2. Now, the three conditions I mentioned can 
be summarized as follows. 
In order to have an intentional state with content p a system S must:
i) have an epistemic window in which the elements that form the content 
p fall;
ii) support the attribution of another content q that satisfy condition i) and 
is extensionally equivalent to p;
iii) give rise to differential behaviors for p and q (that is: attributing p does 
not imply attributing q).
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Now, what kind of content should be considered in this case? Is it necessary 
to  consider  just  type  3 content  or  will  type  2 content  also suffice?  As we have 
pointed out, contents of type 2 are not as fine-grained as content of type 3, but are 
fine-grained  enough  to  sever  the  connection  between  truth-condition  and  the 
correctness conditions for the attribution of the associated functional states without 
regard to possible malfunction. I think they are sufficient in allowing the fixation of 
the property of appearing, the one that is in play when Ulysses appears as a vagrant. 
So, we should show that it is possible to give an interpretation of a case of animal 
deception that meets the conditions met by the situation in which we have supposed 
Ulysses and his enemies. This is the challenge.
Consider  the  following  case,  exhibited  by two home-reared  chimpanzees, 
Austin and Sherman. Austin is smaller than Sherman and subordinate to him but, 
unlike Sherman, he is not afraid of the dark. During the night they both rest in a hut. 
Because  Sherman  was  bullying  Austin  throughout  the  day,  as  night  approaches 
Austin  performs  a  deception  to  reverse  the  dominance  order.  Unobserved  by 
Sherman,  he  goes  out  of  their  hut,  makes  strange  noises  as  though  someone  is 
scraping on the hut, then returns inside and looks outside with a worried stance. 
Sherman  becomes  fearful  and  stops  bullying  him  (Savage-Rumbaugh  and 
McDonald, 1988).23
This case of deception is voluntary, in that Austin would not have performed 
that behavior as a result of some automatic mechanism, nor if Sherman had not been 
nearby; and it is goal-directed, in that the aim is to induce Sherman to stop bullying 
him. But what is important for our purposes is that this could be considered a case in 
which we may interpret an animal’s functional state in terms of content and then 
ascribe to the animal an intentional state. Let us see this conclusion in details.
May we attribute to Sherman a state whose content is: “something is making 
noises outside the hut”? I think we can respond affirmatively. We can attribute this 
state to Sherman because i) Sherman discriminates all the relevant elements of the 
content described and others such as noises, producing noises, and the properties of 
being  inside or  outside  the  hut;  ii)  it  would  be  possible  to  interpret  Sherman’s 
internal functional state as having the content “there is my-hut-companion making 
noises outside the hut”, an interpretation that is contingently equivalent to the state 
of  the  supposed  intentional  state  and  whose  element  can  be  discriminated  by 
Sherman; iii) the attribution of a functional state interpreted as having the content 
“something is making noises outside the hut” does not imply the attribution of a 
functional  state  interpreted  as  having  the  content  “there  is  my-hut-companion 
making noises outside the hut.” From all this follows that Sherman can be credited 
with the attribution of intentional states of type 2 content that “something is making 
noises outside the hut”.24 Now, the attribution is secured by the epistemic window of 
the system, namely, by his discriminatory abilities. These abilities allow Sherman to 
entertain two modes of presentation related to the same truth-conditions. Hence, we 
have an intentional state in a non-speaking creature based on two type 2 contents. 
This case shows that language is not necessary in order to have intentional states.
THE BELIEFS OF MUTE ANIMALS 9
One may object that there is no reason to attribute such complex thoughts to 
Sherman  and  Austin.  It  would  be  sufficient  to  consider,  behavioristically,  their 
reactions to stimuli occurring from moment to moment. This very common line of 
reaction, however, is somewhat paradoxical. In fact, the more the animal behavior is 
complex,  both  as  a  result  of  carefully  stated  anecdotes  and  subtle  experimental 
settings, the more the behavioral explanations have to be articulate. The result of 
having very complex behavioral explanation, though, is that of making them more 
powerful, apt to explain also more and more cases of human behavior. So, we obtain 
animal  non-mentality  at  the  price  of  losing  our  own!  Moreover,  abandoning 
intentional explanation in case of mute animals reduces simplicity and predictability 
in ethology; and with them the advantage of ontological parsimony. Here, it seems, 
empirical and philosophical interests diverge. 
This analysis allows us to meet such other requirements as those invoked, for 
instance, by Quine, Dennett and Davidson, regarding the attribution of intentional 
states.  One of  these  is  that  intentional  systems  cannot  exist  in  isolation.  On the 
present analysis, this condition is satisfied, even if minimally, by any two speechless 
animals. In  fact,  the behavior I have discussed relies on forms of communicative 
interaction:  the conditions  for  believing  are  set  by an animal  (Austin)  while  the 
belief is attributed to another (Sherman). In a certain sense, the response behavior is 
shared  both  by  the  deceiver  and  the  deceived,  and  this  lends  support  to  the 
hypothesis that these animals have a natural “theory of mind” that is shared and used 
for communicative ends.25 Now, since I have not presumed any special ability in the 
two  chimpanzees,  we  may  suppose  their  mental  equipment  is  present  in  other 
individuals of their species as well.
There  is  also  a  second  requirement  satisfied  by  this  approach:  it  is 
implausible to conceive an intentional system with the capacity for a single, isolated 
belief, because of the holistic nature of these states. My proposal, however, is set on 
the assumption that there should be at least two functional states with an equivalent 
content. However,  such an oversimplified system would be an extreme case.  For 
each  belief  we must  admit  that  the  discriminated elements  of  each  state  can  be 
attributed as parts of other complex functional states. 
5.CONCLUSIONS
As far as animals are concerned, my contention has been that we are justified 
in attributing intentional states to a system whenever that system exhibits:
• a behavior governed by functional states;
• the interpretation of those functional states can be put in terms of 
contents that  are supported by discriminations that fall  within its 
epistemic window; and
• the  system  exhibits  behavioral  patterns  that  satisfy  certain 
conditions.
I have used examples of primates because they already give us plentiful evidence for 
grounding such attributions; but it is possible that they are not the only non-speaking 
10 CARTOGRAPHIES OF THE MIND
intentional systems. In looking for other possible candidates, further empirical and 
experimental data must be considered.
I want to conclude with two general considerations. First, since the so-called 
“linguistic turn” there has been a tendency to give an account of thought on the 
model of language. As a consequence, the possibility of any form of non-linguistic 
or pre-linguistic thought has been almost ruled out  a priori. The fact is that those 
who have followed the “linguistic turn” have not only tended to view language as a 
useful methodological tool for analysis, but also as imposing a substantive constraint 
on the nature of thought. Consider again the problem of intentionality. If we analyze 
intentionality in terms of language,  two main routes may be followed: either we 
consider linguistic expressions as the only relevant data for investigation, thereby 
taking language as constraining thought; or we extend the domain of the intentional 
to include those behaviors  that  satisfy certain  criteria  of complexity extrapolated 
from language. The first tradition, perhaps dominant, thinks that language mirrors 
thought and even if “[l]anguage may be a distorting mirror [...] it is the only mirror 
we have” (Dummett 1988, 7). The other tradition considers language as a means to 
exhibit  or  represent  certain  underlying  phenomena,  without  taking this  cognitive 
mechanism as necessarily linguistic in nature: in Quine’s words, “Taking the objects 
of  propositional  attitudes  as  sentences  does  not  require  the  subject  to  speak  the 
language of the object sentence, or any” (1960, 213). In this chapter I have taken this 
second  route.  Our  ascriptions  of  thoughts  does  not  imply  the  ascription  of 
intrinsically  linguistic  states,  for  such  ascriptions  may  well  be  justified  by  the 
relevantly complex non-linguistic behaviors.
Second, by ascribing thoughts to animals we are not supposing that they are 
capable of being in exactly the same kinds of epistemic states as humans. Language 
makes available epistemic attitudes of greater complexity which arguably require a 
different level of analysis. To this end, some philosophers have contrasted beliefs 
with different kinds of doxastic states.26 But if we confine ourselves to certain kinds 
of perceptually fixed beliefs, the cognitive capacities exercised by humans in certain 
situations seem to be much closer in kind to those exhibited by some speechless 
creatures  in  similar  situations  than  they  are  to  those  exercised  by  humans  in 
linguistic tasks. For all these reasons, I think that the analysis here presented may 
allow us to consider, from a different perspective, the relationship between thought 
and language.27
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